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DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CHINA
Justice Robert F Utter*
It gives me great pleasure to submit this essay as part of a tribute to
Professor Luvern Rieke. I first met him in his initial year of teaching
contracts at the University of Washington, when I was a beginning law
student. We later worked together in a variety of contexts including ecumenical religious projects; matters concerning domestic relations subjects
when I served on the King County Superior Court bench; and on the
Judicial Council, where I served as a member of the Washington State
Supreme Court. To each role he brought a unique combination of personal
qualities: he was thoughtful, courteous, concerned, and actively involved
in making law the servant of the people rather than the master.
In recent years, I have been privileged to lead two comparative law study
groups to the People's Republic of China (People's Republic) as part of the
People to People program. 1 Although my knowledge of China's legal and
judicial systems is superficial at best, its long history of using dispute
resolution mechanisms, rather than the courts, offers a fresh and interesting
perspective. Despite cultural, political, and historical differences, Chinese
methods and philosophies of alternate dispute resolution have lessons for
those seeking improvement in our traditional Western adjudicative model.
Professor Rieke's lifelong interest in finding more appropriate methods for
our society to resolve its problems makes this short paper an appropriate
subject for a tribute to him.
I.

THE TRADITIONAL CHINESE VIEW OF LITIGATION

An old proverb expresses the ancient Chinese view of lawsuits: "It is
better to die of starvation than to become a thief; it is better to be vexed to
death than to bring a lawsuit." ' 2 The traditional preference for dispute
*Washington State Supreme Court Justice. I wish to thank my law clerk, Reiko Cushman, for her
assistance on this paper. She is a recent graduate of the University of Washington Law School and a
former student of Professor Rieke who shares my respect for him. Reiko taught classes in comparative
history as a graduate student at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, where she obtained valuable insights
into the cross-cultural enrichment possible between Asian and American cultures.
I. The People to People program is an organization founded by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in
1956. The goal of its Citizen Ambassador Program is to engender friendship between citizens of the
United States and foreign countries through personal contacts. One means of accomplishing this aim is
to set up tours to bring together counterparts in the same professions: lawyers, physicians, farmers, and
the like. CrrizEN AMBASSADOR PROGRAM, PEOPLE TO PEOPLE INT'L (copy on file with the Washington
Law Review).
2. Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization,54 CALIF. L. REv. 1201, 1201 (1966).
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resolution outside a legal court structure continues in modern China. An
elderly Chinese mediator I met in Beijing in 1986 said he favored mediation
because "it is better to keep a friend, than to win a victory." This traditional
tendency to avoid litigation has at least three sources: Confucian philosophy, the unavailability and inadequacy of relief in court, and a mutual
security system that emphasized a societal structure consisting of small
units.
For most of the more than two thousand years before the revolution in
1911, the Chinese legal system reflected societal mores established by the
Confucian philosophy which permeated all facets of life. 3 Confucianism
postulated the existence of a harmony extending throughout heaven and
earth. Earthly harmony manifested itself in a hierarchical order, beginning
with the emperor and extending downward to the lowest level of society.
The aim of government, and indeed of all human relations, was to preserve
natural harmony, which was the source of, and was expressed in, ethical
behavior. Primary ethical rules lay in the li, a variety of moral and
customary principles for ceremonial or polite behavior. 4 Confucianism
became a firmly established state policy in China, with the exception of the
short-lived and harsh Ch'in dynasty of 221-206 B.C., when the "Legalist"
school of thought prevailed. 5 This Legalist school developed the concept of
fa, which corresponds more closely to Western notions of law.6
Chinese legal history from the Ch'in to the Ch'ang dynasty, overthrown
in 1911, reveals an intermingling of Confucian and Legalist strands of
thought. 7 Since 1i provided an insufficient basis to rule the empire, the
Chinese used fa to reinforce it. By combining 1i and fa, concepts of
Confucianism were woven into substantive laws. For example, during this
period of history the Chinese differentiated criminal penalties according to
status-membership in privileged groups like the literati-and position
within the family. 8 This intermingling of the dominant Confucian view of
morality with substantive law produced a uniquely Chinese view of disputes and how they should be resolved. 9
Historically, Chinese jurisprudence placed greater value on compromise
than did its Western counterpart. A most-celebrated and subtle legal art was
3. Mitchell, Dispute Settlement in China, 4 STUDENT INT'L L. Soc'Y INT'L L.J. 71, 71-72 (1980).
4. Lubman, Mao andMediation: Politicsand Dispute Resolution in Communist China, 55 CALIF.
L. REV. 1284, 1290 (1967).
5. Id.
6. Note, Commercial Dispute Resolution Betveen the United States and the People'sRepublic of
China:Problems and Prospects, 7 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 329, 336 (1983).
7. Lubman, supra note 4, at 1290-91.
8. A. CLAYRE, THE HEART OF THE DRAGON 180-83 (1985).
9. See Schwartz, On Attitudes Toward Law in China in GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW AND THE
INDIVIDUAL 27-39 (M. Katz ed. 1957).
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that ofjang, which translates as "yielding," or giving way on certain points
in order to garner the advantage on others, thereby fostering a compromise
between the parties.10 Use of jang diminished the stature of those who
would invoke their "rights" on a unilateral basis so as to aggrandize their
position at the expense of another. Moreover, customary ethical rules of
behavior, which emphasized status and the necessity of maintaining group
harmony, greatly inhibited the assertion of rights. 1' Consequently, the
Chinese regarded rights-based claims as disruptive violations of fundamental ethical rules.
Although Confucianism stressed the virtue of yielding and compromise
so as to avoid friction, it did not prevent the rulers of China from establishing a court system. The courts of traditional China, however, served not
only as judicial centers of dispute settlement, but also as the local outposts
of the civil service administration. The county magistrate in his yamen, or
court, supervised the gamut of civil services. 12 Although they were experts
in the classics, magistrates received no training in administration. Instead,
a magistrate acquired a considerable number of assistants who performed
the actual administrative duties. These assistants developed a legendary,
and frequently well-deserved, reputation for greed, corruption, and insolence. 13 At virtually every stage of the proceedings, a magistrate's assistants felt free to extract "customary fees," payment of which often
proved ruinous to the parties and their families. "Win your lawsuit and lose
your money" was an aphorism born of common experience. 14 Consequently, involving an enemy in a lawsuit became well recognized as an
effective method of gaining revenge. 15
In addition to being inordinately expensive, time-consuming, and unpredictable in outcome, resort to a magistrate often proved a harsh and
degrading experience. Litigation constituted a public admission of some
personal failing and required the revelation of private problems to unknown
third parties. Moreover, those who went to court often suffered humiliation
at the hands of members of the magistrate's staff, who were their social
inferiors. Pending trial and during the long period that the case might be on
appeal, the court sometimes illegally incarcerated one or more of the

10.
11.

Note, supra note 6, at 337.
See Northrup, The MediationalApproval Theory ofLaw in American LegalRealism, 44 VA. L.

REv. 347, 349 (1958).
12.
13.
14.
15.

Mitchell, supra note 3, at 72.
Lubman, supra note 4, at 1296 & n.41.
Cohen, supra note 2, at 1214.
Id.
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litigants. No professional advocate was permitted to represent them. Occasionally, in order to elicit evidence, legally prescribed torture was administered in court. 16 Litigation often led to years of embittered relations
between disputants and their respective families, with disputes frequently
expanding to involve clans, villages, or guilds. 17
Although the corruption and abuses of the judicial system violated the
law, the emperors displayed little concern when the courts proved inadequate as mechanisms for resolving disputes. Perhaps the best known
expression of the philosophy underlying the imperial attitude toward litigation came in a statement by the K'ang-hsi Emperor (1662-1722):
[L]awsuits would tend to increase to a frightful amount, if people were not
afraid of the tribunals, and if they felt confident of always finding in them
ready and perfect justice .

.

. I desire, therefore, that those who have

recourse to the tribunals should be treated without any pity, and in such a
manner that they shall be disgusted with law, and tremble to appear before a
magistrate. 18
Even though the injustice inherent in the system led most people to avoid
the courts, the Chinese could avail themselves of less formal, although
equally powerful, means of dealing with civil and criminal disputes. Since
at least the third century B.C. the Chinese used the pao-chia mutual
security system, under which localities were divided into small and smaller
groups, whose members were responsible for each others' conduct and tax
payment. 19 Extended families, clans, guilds, and other groups also performed dispute settlement functions. 20 The pressure such groups applied
had the force of traditional teaching behind it, and the application of peer
pressure ensured compliance. Although specific means of mediation varied, the common goal was the reconciliation of the parties and the restoration of harmony within the group. A familiar basis for settlement required a
party who had been found to be in the wrong to make some gracious gesture
toward the group. The "guilty" party might host a large feast or a theatrical
entertainment for the entire village. In this way, he or she could make
amends for disrupting the social fabric and be reintegrated into the group. 2'
This system of informal dispute resolution had inherent advantages for
the people, even if individual cases were often handled arbitrarily. Prevailing social values stressed the necessity of avoiding conflict, observing
16. SeeD. BONAVIA, THE CHINESE 156-57 (1982); A. CLAYRE, supra note 8, at 184-85; Lubman,
supra note 4, at 1295-97.
17. Cohen, supra note 2, at 1214-15.
18. Id.at 1215.
19. Mitchell, supra note 3, at 73.
20. Cohen, supra note 2, at 1223.
21. Lubman, supra note 4, at 1298.
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proper rules of behavior, and relying on the social group to resolve
differences. Thus, the informal system provided auxiliary support for the
dissemination of Confucian standards and values. Extrajudicial mediation
also eased the government's work burden and helped avoid friction between
magistrates and the people in their jurisdictions. By handling a broad range
of disputes, these extrajudicial groups spared the government the necessity
of drafting a comprehensive body of legislation. "In a country as large as
China, with its variety of local customs, this would have been a formidable
22
task. "
Thus, as China entered the twentieth century, extrajudicial mediation
was the dominant form of dispute resolution. Confucian philosophical
tenets, the structure of Chinese society, and the operation of imperial
governmental institutions had combined to produce this striking preference
for mediated settlement of disputes.
II.

MEDIATION DURING THE TRANSITION FROM THE OLD TO
THE NEW CHINA

The first half of the twentieth century was a period of immense upheaval
in China. Beginning with the overthrow of the Ch'ing dynasty in 1911,
China suffered from increasing internal chaos, capped by the struggle
between the Nationalist and Communist forces and the battles waged by
both of those groups against the Japanese.2 3 Although the Nationalists
succeeded in establishing a central government in 1928, they had little time
or good fortune to build a modern, Western-style government. Their
attempt to engraft a complete civil law system onto the roots of the Chinese
legal establishment never functioned effectively. "Traditional, informal,
extrajudicial mediation remained the characteristic mode of dispute settlement throughout the years of Nationalist rule." 24 By contrast, as part of its
reordering of Chinese society, the People's Republic restructured the
traditional institutions for settling disputes and created some new institutions. In many respects, dispute resolution now bears the heavy imprint of
Communist ideology and perspectives. 2 5
Maoism supplies a view of the world and an agenda for changing it. The
"cadre" serves the party in implementing policy. Cadres are party members and other persons who hold paid administrative posts in the government hierarchy and in the many quasi-governmental organizations. Mao's
22. Cohen, supra note 2, at 1225.
23. Mitchell, supra note 3, at 74.
24. Lubman, supra note 4, at 1300.
25. See Zhu, Mediation:The FirstLineofDefense (unpublished manuscript presented at the 1985
Annual Meeting of the American Comparative Law Society) (copy on file with the Washington Law
Review).
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fundamental concern with transforming the thought of individuals lies at
the heart of strategies aimed at mobilizing the masses. In the Maoist view,
political thought is incorrect unless it proceeds from and applies the correct
thought. The thought and consciousness of individuals and their social
classes must be changed by "resolving their contradictions" through the
use of tools of struggle, especially "criticism and self-criticism" and
26
"thought reform. "
Mao's original concern was to mobilize the support of China's masses,
especially the poor peasants who made up the overwhelming majority of
China's people. During the 1930's and 1940's, Maoist ideology and the
Chinese Communist political style evolved in response to the need for a tiny
minority of revolutionaries, isolated among hundreds of politically inert
peasants, to create a vast party-led revolutionary army. 2 7 Mao began to
structure his own system in 1927, at the same time that the Nationalist
government was engaged in its attempts at reform. Mao set up a basic
judicial system, and from 1931 through 1934 enacted laws governing land
use, labor, marriage, and punishment of counter-revolutionaries. 28 The
Chinese institution known as the "procuracy" also appeared during this
time period. Relying on the Soviet model, the Chinese procuracy investigates criminal cases, evaluates the sufficiency of the evidence gathered,
and calls for review of improper decisions. 29 Many of the early leaders of
the procuracy were philosophers, teachers, and men of letters, but virtually
none had any training in the law. After the onset of the Civil War in the late
1920's, military officers took leadership positions. When the Communists
came to power in 1949, they were extremely sensitive to Western charges
that traditional Chinese law was backward. They also had a general feeling
that a "modern" legal system would somehow promote the development of
Chinese society. 30 Thus, the Communists moved quickly to set up a formal
legal system of their own. As in most other areas of governmental design,
31
China patterned the new legal system after that of the Soviet Union.
To staff the new legal system, the Communists retained a number of
legal specialists who had worked for the Nationalists, primarily because
the Communists did not have within their own ranks people with the skills
26. Lubman, supra note 4, at 1304-05.
27. Id. at 1301.
28. Letter from Jose Trias-Monge, Chief Justice, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Supreme Court,
to Vincent L. MuKusick, Chief Justice, Maine State Supreme Court (June 27, 1983), reprinted in
JOURNAL OF THE PEOPLE TO PEOPLE APPELLATE JUDGES DELEGATION, May 13-June 3, 1983.

29.

See T. HsIA & K. HAUN, THE RE-EMERGENCE OF THE PROCURATORIAL SYSTEM IN THE PEOPLE'S

REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1978).

30.

Li, Reflections on the Current DriveToward GreaterLegalization in China, 10 GA. J. INT'L &

COMP. L. 221, 224 (1980).

31.
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and knowledge to run a complex legal system. These Western-style legal
specialists possessed useful legal skills and held posts where such skills
were thought necessary. 32 They were, however, considered politically
unreliable, and to have an "elitist work style" that did not fit well into the
"mass line" approach. For these reasons, a number of "new cadres" were
brought into legal work after liberation. They received their positions not
for legal skill, but due to their ideological purity or political dependability.
After liberation, legal work in China was handled by these two distinct
groups. The new cadres lacked legal skills and knowledge, but did bring a
new approach to the law. They did not automatically assume that China
33
needed a modern legal system, replete with codes requiring specialists.
Instead, they argued that the law should be simple, free of technicalities,
and easy for anyone to understand. The "new cadres" stressed simplicity,
in part to rationalize their own lack of legal expertise. But they also based
their views on the underlying principle that law should be broadly based,
and not the special province of a group of elite professionals. Law could
than a set of rules accessible only
then become the tool of the masses, rather
34
to members of the legal profession.
During the first few years after the Communists took power, the specialists generally held the dominant position. Their efforts helped establish
law codification commissions, judicial and police structures, and rules of
operation. Law schools again began to operate, and some legal books and
periodicals were published. In 1954, the work of the specialists culminated
with the enactment of a series of major laws, including the first Chinese
Constitution. The new constitution introduced a tripartite governmental
design, consisting of the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's
Procuracy, and the State Council, all responsible to the Standing Commit35
tee of the National People's Congress.
Over a period of twenty years, the Chinese system suffered from a series
of major upheavals. In 1957, the "Anti-Rightist Movement" caused the
removal of many specialists from their positions, and the policies they
advocated were attacked and denounced. This led to the closure of law
schools and the termination of plans for further codification. As the reliable
and conclusive authority in every case, the party leadership could supplant
any given law and the public security bureaus assumed the functions of the
36
courts and the procuracy.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Mitchell, supra note 3, at 75-77.
Li, supra note 30, at 225.
Id. at 225-26.
Mitchell, supra note 3, at 76.
Id. at 76, 77; A. Ct.AYRE, supra note 8, at 186.
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On the heels of the Anti-Rightist Movement, China entered the period of
attempted rapid increase in industrialization and agricultural production
known as the "Great Leap Forward." Lasting from 1958 to 1960, the Great
Leap created havoc throughout China. Conditions during this period required the continuation of the strong central control of the party. 37 From the
abortive Great Leap until the Cultural Revolution, which began in 1966,38
the formal criminal process regained some of its lost stature. Legal study
also made cautious progress. When fines or detention were not considered
appropriate punishment, "criticism-education" 39 was used to enable the
wrongdoer to reform himself. These "mass line" techniques soared to
prominence during the Cultural Revolution. The "mass line" included
administration of justice by "the people," rather than by those speciallytrained for such work. 40 During the rule of the "Gang of Four"
(1966-1976), however, the Chinese used violent and often brutal techniques to accomplish a well-known objective of the times: the overthrow of
positive law and everyone associated with it, including lawyers, policemen,
4
procurators, and judges. '
"The period of calm after the Cultural Revolution presented an opportunity for reassessment of the functions served by each of the legal
organs." ' 42 The 1978 constitution restored the tripartite administration of
justice established under the 1954 constitution, all under Party leadership. 43 This led to a movement, begun in 1978, to provide China with a
strengthened legal system. Lawyers and law schools are again in evidence,
as are legal publications. 44 The legalization drive is linked to the drive for
the "Four Modernizations" of science, agriculture, industry, and national
defense emphasized by China's current leadership. 45 Despite these changes
37. During the Great Leap Forward, in order to enhance industrialization and production efforts,
China established People's Communes all over the country. Nevertheless, Mao's ultra-left and isolationist economic policies brought the country to the verge of starvation. D. BONAVIA, supra note 16, at
107.
38. The Cultural Revolution. led by the "Gang of Four," was a dark era in modem China's history.
marked by the intolerant and violent oppression of the intelligentsia. It was a backlash against the
failures of the Great Leap Forward, during which Mao "purged" thousands of top administrators,
educators, and scientists who were unhappy with the enforced isolation. See id. at 142-43.
39. "Criticism-education" is a Maoist technique wherein the individual who has gone astray is
required to publicly submit to, and participate in, a critique of his or her "wrong thinking." The avowed
purpose of the procedure is to "correct" the individual after temporary alienation. Lubman, supra note
4, at 1305 n.80 (citation omitted).
40. Id. at 1303.
41. D. BONAVIA, supra note 16, at 154.
42. Mitchell, supra note 3, at 78.
43. Id.
44. Li, supra note 30. at 228-29.
45. Mitchell. supra note 3, at 78.
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and an increasing tendency to take recourse in the courts, the formal legal
46
system still handles a mere fraction of the number of cases which arise.
Im_.THE ROLE OF ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
MECHANISMS IN MODERN CHINESE LEGAL THEORY
Modem Chinese legal theory is based on the Marxist theory of law,
which evolves from the application of dialectical materialism to a series of
political and legal dualities. 47 The Chinese Communist Party "conforms to
the Leninist notion of a communist party-a disciplined, elite body of
professional revolutionaries leading the masses, especially the proletariat,
whose dictatorship it is supposed to embody."48 Under Marxist theory, the
law serves the function of creating and maintaining a social order that is
advantageous to the ruling class of a society.49 However, certain areas of
human experience and conduct lie beyond the reach of the law. Social
control cannot be maintained by means of law alone, but must be supplemented by morality and the policies of the ruling party. By adjusting
relations such as love, friendship, family life, and the like, morality affects
a broader range of personal relationships. While the courts may apply the
laws, mediation, by virtue of its informality and flexibility, provides a more
appropriate forum for the exercise of morality. 50
Unlike law, which relies on the coercive power of the state, morality
finds its support in public opinion, custom, tradition, persuasion, and
education. The mediation forum derives its sustaining force from the fact
that the disputants are members of interlocking networks of social and work
organizations which also participate in the dispute resolution process. 5 1
Despite these differences, Marxist jurists believe that morality, like law,
possesses class character. 52 Different classes have different moral standards. The interests of the proletariat serve as the basis for communist
moral standards. At the center of communist morality lies the concept of
collectivism. To live up to moral standards, the individual must measure
his own interest against the interest of the collectives in which he participates, and against the interests of the state. Mediators can bring party
policy into play by politicizing the issues in a dispute so that a larger issue
46. O'Hara, Dispute Resolution in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's
Republic of China, 33 R.I.B.J. 4, 7 (1985).

47. Zhu, supra note 25, at 6.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Lubman, supra note 4, at 1301.
Zhu, supra note 25, at 7.
Id. at 10-13.
Lubman, supra note 4, at 1309-25.
Zhu, supra note 25, at 12.
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of party policy may transcend the disputants' personal grievances. The
antagonist's potential or actual interference with some policy provides the
mediator with persuasive grounds to urge disputants to take a more moder53
ate stance on an issue.
The conception of rights and liabilities in the People's Republic differs
radically from that held in the West. Chinese jurists criticize the capitalist
legal system as one that has trivialized and commercialized matters such as
human dignity, conscience, reputation, pain and morality into items of
merchandise that have a price and can be exchanged. 54 In the People's
Republic redress for injuries to one's personal rights are naturally channeled into mediation proceedings. However, the People's Republic has not
explicitly adopted the mediation practices that existed under preceding
regimes. Such an assertion of continuity would conflict with the Party's
attempt to discredit both the imperial and the republican systems of law as
exploiters of the masses. Instead, the Chinese Communists find their own
historical heritage of mediation in their two decades of control over revolutionary bases in remote "liberated areas" of China prior to their assumption
55
of national power in 1949.
Today, mediation in China reflects the application of communist ideology within the intricate institutional network built around each individual's role in modern Chinese society. Small groups inhabit the lowest rung
on the ladder of organization in China. Each small group contains about ten
to twenty people, organized primarily by place of residence and by place of
employment. These groups have regular meetings to discuss their understanding of current events and ideology. To rectify any errors in their
thoughts, everyone must speak out. When a particular problem arises, the
group will "criticism-educate" the offending member, and will apply
social pressure in an attempt to bring the member's behavior into line with
group norms. 56 Membership in these various groups will overlap so that
people may be pressured to conform by almost everyone with whom they
come into contact. In many of these cases the mediator has overheard or
witnessed the incident in question. If any one of the mediators fails in an
attempt at mediation, they will call representatives from one or more of the
other relevant groups. "The strength of this web of organization lies in its
emphasis on cooperation and in group pressure adapted to the particular
57
circumstances of each case."
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
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Zhu, supra note 25, at 4.
Cohen, supra note 2, at 1205.
Mitchell, supra note 3, at 79.
Id. at 80.
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In today's China, mediation serves a variety of functions. One function
of mediation is, of course, to resolve disputes. In so doing, mediation
maintains public order by ending disruptions of the social fabric and
ensures the orderly functioning of economic activity. Aimed at ending bad
feelings between disputants, mediation offers the individuals involved a
highly informal and readily available mode of settling their dispute. Mediation in China, however, also serves other identifiable functions that may
overshadow dispute settlement. It serves to articulate and apply the ideaological principles, values, and programs of the Chinese Communist
Party and helps to mobilize China's people to increase their commitment to
party policies and goals. 58 Rather than settling disputes between individuals, mediation also serves to suppress such disputes, which are regarded as
harmful social conflict that interferes with the construction of a strong
59
socialist China.
Undoubtedly, mediation in China has undergone a shift in emphasis.
While the traditional mediation system was the product of Confucian
ideology and traditional institutions, Chinese mediation today applies
communist ideology within the web of relationships surrounding the individual. Since 1978, yet another shift in mediation's political emphasis has
occurred. 60 The current leadership has reassessed China's class relations
and the scope of class struggle in the current Chinese society. Today, the
most important issue in Chinese politics concerns the realization within
this century of the Four Modernizations-science, agriculture, industry,
and national defense. With this shift of emphasis, the style of people's
mediation work is also undergoing changes. The discouragement of
"unprincipled settlement" has abated, as the encouragement of harmony
among the populace is a prerequisite for the success of China's Four
Modernizations plan. 6 1 With the dawn of the 1980's, China finally inaugurated a new legal system with six codes covering crime, civil procedures,
and elections to government office.62
Despite the continued shift in political emphasis, mediation in China has
maintained a certain continuity. The traditional forces underlying the use of
mediation continue to exist even in modem China. These forces include the
continuing practice of extrajudicial resolution of civil disputes, a deficiency in adequate judicial remedies, and a lack of rules defining the
individual's substantive rights in private relationships. Specific features of
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Lubman, supra note 4, at 1339.
Id. at 1346-49; see also Zhu, supra note 25.
A. CLAYRE, supra note 8, at 188-89; O'Hara, supra note 46, at 6, 8, 13.
Zhu, supra note 25, at 17.
D. BONAVIA, supra note 16, at 152.
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mediation have endured massive upheaval throughout China's history. Just
as in traditional China, mediation in the People's Republic takes place in
the context of a nation with a largely integrated world view. The parties to
any given dispute share a large set of values and assumptions that can be
appropriately and usefully appealed to in order to put the dispute into a
larger perspective, and to allow the parties more readily to modify their
positions in order to further their shared vision. For the Chinese, each
person's identity is intimately and essentially defined by their many relationships within the intricate network of Chinese society. 63 Disputes never
affect only the primary parties-that which touches one person must
inevitably reverberate through the lives of a host of others. Throughout their
history, the Chinese have recognized that one cannot replace some things
with money or other material goods. Traditional China practiced in its
informal mediation what the "cadres" of the People's Republic have made
explicit-the notion that the rules by which people govern their lives should
be simple, accessible, and understandable by the people.
Recent developments bear witness to the fact that the People's Republic
is a country in a state of constant flux. Predictions for the future are difficult
to make. Under Mao, China's legal experience consisted of little formal
criminal or civil law. From 1966 to 1971, during the height of the Cultural
Revolution, the rule of law-such as it was-ceased to exist, and the
military ran the country. For the eleven years of the Cultural Revolution,
law was whatever those in power at the time wanted it to be. Yet as we have
seen, to some degree mediation in China today presents continuity with
past tradition. China's seemingly inherent ability to maintain this continuity leaves one with a belief that whatever faction currently holds power,
mediation will play an integral role in China's social structure. A conversation I had with a Beijing official about the breakdown of formal law
during the Cultural Revolution provided some insight into the strength and
value of China's tradition of mediation. I asked this official how his country
of over one billion people managed their personal and commercial disputes
during that time. His reply was one word: "tradition." A tradition that has
demonstrated such tremendous resilience and power can surely teach us
much.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although the United States proceeds from a very different cultural basis
than China in resolving disputes, we share more common factors with
China than we would initially suspect. Our court system has as its goal the
efficient administration of thoroughgoing justice, rather than a historic and
63.

A. CLAYRE, supra note 8, at 92-93.
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cultural design to inhibit its use. Nonetheless, the reality is that, for many
with either commercial or personal disputes, the cost and delay of our
traditional system can make its use impractical or impossible.
In the past twenty years, we have experienced a flowering of interest in
alternative dispute resolution techniques, which have historical roots in this
country. Dispute resolution techniques have traditionally existed in
culturally closeknit communities and in many areas of commerce in the
United States. "Arbitration has been used to resolve commercial disputes
for hundreds of years, and mediation was commonplace in the religious
communities in colonial New England." 64 In the mid-1800's, when the
first generation of Chinese immigrants arrived in California, the strong
anti-Chinese movement led them to form their own dispute settlement
program, modeled after thepao-chisystem of traditional China. 65 In 1920,
the Jewish Conciliation Board was established in New York City to handle
problems specific to the Jewish community. 66 Recently, the Christian
Conciliation Service has been established nationally to respond to disputes
between members of the Christian faith, with its services open to others, as
well. 67 The formal judicial systems of many states acknowledge the role
alternative forms of dispute resolution have to play in relieving court
congestion and in encouraging more harmonious settlement of differences.
Washington State, for example, has enacted a mandatory arbitration system
for civil actions where the sole relief sought is a money judgment beneath a
68
sum set by statute.
Businesses of all sizes recognize that for many disputes, our current
system is wasteful and often counterproductive. Getting to Yes, by Roger
Fisher and William Ury, is a popular current publication that describes
techniques for reaching a solution that optimizes the result for all parties
concerned. 69 The book focuses on the underlying values shared, or at least
acknowledged, by the parties to the dispute. The goal is to preserve the
relationship, rather than to pursue the absolute victory that we have been
accustomed to seek in our system.
64. S.GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION 1 (1985).
65. VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION AS ALTERNATIVES TO PROSECUTION IN
FELONY ARREST CASES, AN EVALUATION OFTHE BROOKLYN DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTER (FIRST YEAR) 1
(1979).
66. Id.
67. The Christian Conciliation Service (CCS) is a national organization of Christian attorneys and
others, with ministries provided to local churches. "Christian conciliation" is the voluntary submission
of a legal dispute to the CCS for mediation andlor arbitration. The process incorporates the laws of the
State of Vashington and Biblical principles ofjustice, love, forgiveness, and reconciliation. Rules of
Procedure, Christian Conciliation Service of Puget Sound, Rule 2 (copy on file with the Washington
Law Review).
68. See WASH. REv. CODE ch. 7.06 (1986); WASH. Sup. Cr. MANDATORY ARB. R. (1986).
69. R. FISHER & W. URY, GErTIG TO YES (1981).
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While the focus on dispute resolution offers hope for a more productive
method of settling conflicts in many areas of our society, it holds the most
promise in a field where Professor Rieke has made invaluable and significant contributions-domestic relations. Mediation has been practiced in
dissolution cases to allow the parties control and responsibility over the
disposition of their most intimate disputes in a context of greater privacy
than afforded in a legal confrontation. Particularly in custody disputes,
mediation offers hope that parents will engage in cooperative problemsolving to the ultimate benefit of our entire society. 70
Our Western focus on individual rights differs greatly from the Chinese
view of self as the totality of relationships touching one's life. Nevertheless,
we can gain much as a society by identifying those circumstances where
preservation of a relationship is more important than achieving a "victory."
Educators such as Professor Rieke have made great strides toward this goal
by preparing both the heads and hearts of law school graduates to meet this
challenge.

70.
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See, e.g., D. SAPOSNEK, MEDIATING CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES (1983).

